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Abstract
We investigated an individual ability to identify whether choices were made freely or forced by external parameters. We
capitalized on magical setups where the notion of psychological forcing constitutes a well trodden path. In live stage magic,
a magician guessed cards from spectators while inquiring how freely they thought they had made the choice. Our data
showed a marked blindness in the introspection of free choice. Spectators assigned comparable ratings when choosing the
card that the magician deliberately forced them compared to any other card, even in classical forcing, where the magician
literally handles a card to the participant This observation was paralleled by a laboratory experiment where we observed
modest changes in subjective reports by factors with drastic effect in choice. Pupil dilatation, which is known to tag slow
cognitive events related to memory and attention, constitutes an efficient fingerprint to index subjective and objective
aspects of choice.
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Introduction
The word ‘‘forcing’’ is used in stage magic to describe the act in
which a subject reports to have made a free decision among equal
possibilities while manipulated by the performer whom, then,
secretly knows the outcome of the choice. As with other key
aspects of the cognitive foundation of magic [1,2,3], in psycho-
logical forcing the performer uses the fact that only a small and
distorted set of information is available to the spectator’s
introspective constructs. Physiological forcing is an area of intense
debate and study in stage magic [4,5,6]. Here we set to capitalize
on this basic magical procedure to understand the subjective
construct of free or conditioned choice.
As with similar recent enterprises which have linked magic
tradition to neuroscience [7,8,9,10] and psychology [11], here we
progressively drift from street magic to the laboratory. First, we
conducted a one-on-one stage-magic performance, where the
magician follows a script designed to inquire participants about
their subjective feeling of choosing freely or forced. This
questionnaire implemented by the magician was naturally
embedded in the performance as part of the show. We assessed
two techniques used in stage magic to force a card, namely the
Visual Forcing (VF) and the Classical Forcing (CF) [12,13]. The
VF consists of asking one spectator to choose a card by taking a
mental picture of it while riffling the whole deck in front of his/her
eyes. Since at least 1959 [13] magicians know that subjects tend to
choose the last cards of the deck and the ones shown long enough
to influence choice, but subtle enough to make the procedure
opaque. The CF consists in asking one spectator to pick a card on
the deck held by the magician while timing the handling of the
deck in such a way that the card to be forced reaches the subject’s
fingers at the moment he picks a card. CF has been used by stage
magicians for centuries [4].
We then replicated the VF experiment in a laboratory setup
where all variables are precisely timed, and measured pupil
dilatation as a first step to identify physiological markers of the
subjective construct of free or forced choices. We showed a
marked blindness in the introspection of free choice in live magical
shows: spectators assigned very similar ratings when they chose the
card that the magician deliberately enforced them compared to
the ratings when selecting any other card. In the laboratory
experiment we observed modest changes in subjective reports of
free choice by factors which have a drastic effect in choice (for
example, card duration and card position in the deck). Finally,
pupil dilatation, which was known to tag slow cognitive events
related to memory and attention [14], constitutes a rapid and
efficient fingerprint to index subjective and objective aspects of
choice.
Materials and Methods
Participants
All subjects gave written informed consent and were naı¨ve about
the aims of the experiments. All the experiments described in this
paper were reviews and approved by the ethics committee:
‘‘Comite´ de E´tica del Centro de Educacio´n Me´dica e Investiga-
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ciones Clı´nicas ‘‘Norberto Quirno’’ (CEMIC)’’ qualified by the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS, USA):
IRb00001745 - IORG 0001315.
Experiment 1
31 subjects completed the task (42% females; mean age 28,
range 19–51). Participants were volunteers recruited on a public
place. The performer approaches unknown people and asks if they
would like to be part of a magic spectacle, mentioning that it is
part of an experiment on human decision making. After
acceptance, a magician collaborator films and the performer
explains that he will first ask the spectator to make some choices
and then to rate how free they felt in doing so: if the spectator feels
he/she has been somehow manipulated, the rate should be 0; if
he/she feels to have made a free decision, without being
influenced by external factors, they should rate a 10. They were
asked to interpolate their perceived feeling of free choice in a
continuous scale between 0 and 10. These results were offline
rescaled to the interval 0–1 and inverted (higher values meant
feeling more forced), to agree with the second experiment.
The scripted routine was run by a professional magician; he
performed a sequence of four different guesses: three chosen cards
and then a number freely thought by the spectator. The average
duration of the routines was 3:31 minutes and the results were
measured by analysing the filmed videos offline.
Experiment 2
Material. A total of 103 video files were recorded while a
trained magician riffled the deck. As in stage performances, the
magician forced one card by slightly folding it and hence
presenting it for a longer duration. Each video file was tagged
frame by frame to time precisely the presentation of each card. On
average the riffles lasted 4040 ms (SD 600 ms) and average card
exposure time was 82 ms (SD 45 ms). The video files were
recorded at 60 frames per second, each frame was presented for
16.6 ms.
Procedure. Stimuli were presented on a 19-inch CRT
monitor (10246768 pixels resolution; frame rate 60 Hz). Partic-
ipants were seated in front of the monitor with the head positioned
on a chin rest at a distance of 50 cm from the monitor. Eye
movements were recorded with a desktop-mounted, video-based
eye tracker (EyeLink 1000, SR Research Ltd., Ontario, Canada)
at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz. Nominal average is accuracy 0.5u,
and space resolution is 0.01u RMS. Participant’s gaze was
calibrated with a standard 13-point grid for both eyes. All
recordings and calibration were binocular. Only right eye data was
used for the analysis. The experiment was implemented in Matlab
(Mathworks, Natick, MA) using Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard,
1997).
Participants. 20 subjects completed the task (40% females;
mean age 27, range 20–61). Participants were volunteers recruited
from the general population of the University of Buenos Aires and
were paid for their participation. All subjects were native speakers
of Spanish who reported normal (or corrected to normal) vision.
Analysis. The visual forcing was considered effective when
the participant chose either one of the two last cards (forced by
position), or one of the two longest cards in each riffle (forced by
duration). ROC curves were calculated for each individual,
considering separately both forcing by duration and forcing by
position. The procedure to calculate ROC curves is the following.
for each threshold value across the interval [0,1], two quantities
are calculated: the proportion of high-SRF in forced trials p(high
SRF | forced) (the number of SRF values greater or equal to the
threshold in forced trials, divided by the number of forced trials),
and the proportion of high-SRF in non-forced trials p(high SRF |
non-forced) (the number of SRF values greater than the threshold
in non-forced trials, divided by the number of non-forced trials).
ROC area of 0.5 (a straight line) corresponds to individuals with
poor introspection.
For the statistical analysis of pupil size, subject’s averages were
calculated for each condition. With these curves, a 2-way ANOVA
(objective forcing and subjective report) was performed at running
bins of 50 ms. A result was considered significant when at least 5
consecutive bins were below p = 0.05.
Results
Experiment 1
We measured psychological forcing in one-on-one stage
performances (see Video S1. People in the video have given
written informed consent, as outlined in the PLOS consent form,
to publication of the video.). A professional magician ran a scripted
routine where he performed a sequence of four different guesses:
three chosen cards and then a number freely thought by the
spectator. The first two guesses followed respectively Visual
Forcing and Classic Forcing procedures. If the forcing was
unsuccessful the magician pulled out the chosen card by subtle
prestidigitation using various techniques, including an ordered
deck, false shuffling, and a palming technique consisting in hiding
a card in the magician’s hand. In the third guess the spectator was
asked to think and say aloud any card of the deck which then the
magician managed to appear as the only face down card in a deck
of face up cards. In the fourth guess, the spectator was asked to
choose a number which then ‘‘magically’’ appeared written in a
piece of paper held by the magician. Here, prestidigitation was
used to write the number in the paper after it was chosen. None of
the spectators participating in this study detected the magician
prestidigitation in any of the four guesses.
After each guess, independently of whether the guessed card
had been forced or not, the spectator was asked whether he felt
that he had chosen the card freely or, instead, if he/she thought
that the magician had biased his/her selection. Participants were
asked to report this in a scale from zero to one. This questionnaire
did not disrupt the performance; instead it flew coherently as part
of the spectacle. A simple inspection of the videos showed that all
participants were vividly engaged throughout the performance.
Visual and classical psychological forcing was effective (partic-
ipant chose the card that the magician attempted to force)
respectively for 14 (45%) and 17 (54%) out of 31 participants. Both
forcing procedures were simultaneously effective for 8 (26%) which
is the closest integer to the expected value (7.66) of simultaneous
forcing probability, given that the likelihood to be forced by each
procedure is independent. Although these percentages of forcing
success could seem low, they are in fact relatively high given the
context of the experiments. Thus, and contrary to what could be
expected, experienced magicians rarely rely on the probability of
forcing success alone. They often make use of parallel lines of
action to cover potential forcing failures, including the introduc-
tion of alternative endings, such as in our routine when, as stated
above, the magician pulled out the chosen card anyway by subtle
prestidigitation. Moreover, when performing street magic, magi-
cians try not to use these physiological forcing routines right at the
beginning of their show; but rather they usually do it after
conditioning the spectator in different ways to increase success
rates. One such strategy is, for example, to allow the mark to take
a card freely before introducing the classical forcing. In addition,
magicians are trained to be quite good at identifying the more
susceptible subjects in their audience to be forced. In our case,
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none of these precautions were taken, our subjects were randomly
recruited in a public place (a shopping mall) and the experiments
began right away, to avoid introducing bias and/or other
confounding factors.
Subjective reports of forcing (SRF) were very similar and did not
differ significantly for both forcing procedures: 0.13260.037 for
visual forcing and 0.11360.039 (SE) for classical forcing (paired t-
test: t(30) = 0.39, p = 0.69) (Table 1). More importantly, we did not
observe any difference when splitting these reports between
effective and ineffective forcing procedures (unpaired t-test:
t(60) = 0.60, p = 0.55, mean SRF effective forcing: 0.13860.043,
mean SRF not forced: 0.10660.032 SE). We then submitted the
data to an ANOVA with the number of guess as main factor (the
third and fourth guesses were not driven by forcing procedures).
The effect of guess number (1 to 4) on SRF was not significant (2-
way ANOVA: effect of guess number: f(3,86) = 0.91, p = 0.44,
effect of participant: f(30,86) = 2.03, p = 0.006). Together, these
results indicate that the subjective perception of being forced did
not change when subjects were actually being forced (successfully
or not) or whether the choice they made relied on a mechanical
action (a card riffle) or the generation of an internal thought out of
a number of options (choosing a number).
Experiment 2
To examine these findings in quantitative detail we conducted a
simplified version of this experiment in a laboratory setup. We
filmed 103 different card riffles produced by a magician. As in
stage performances, the magician forced one card by slightly
folding it and hence presenting it for a longer duration. We then
analyzed the videos offline, frame by frame, to time the duration of
each card. Participants were asked to fixate in the centre of the
deck and their gaze was controlled.
We analyzed choice based on two regressors which are well
known to affect selection as documented both in psychological
research [15,16] and in the magic literature [12]: duration and
position in the deck. This analysis revealed indeed a sharp and
very significant effect of both factors in choice (Figure 1). The card
presented for longer duration (number 1 in rank of duration) was
chosen in 20.8% (SE 2.1%) of all trials and the last card of the deck
was selected in 15.0% (SE 1.6%) of all trials. Both values are very
large and highly significant (p,0.00001) compared to chance
levels (1/49 or about 2%, dashed line, which corresponds to the
average, 49.2 (SD 2.3) cards presented in each riffle, which is
slightly less than the total number of cards -52).
In contrast with this sharp transition in likelihood of choice,
subjective report of forcing showed a weak (but significant)
dependence on these two forcing parameters (Figure 1 c-d). SRF
showed a significant difference in the mean value for both forcing
conditions, when comparing forced choices (two longest or two last
cards) to unforced choices (paired t-test of mean subject’s values;
forcing by position: t(19) = 3.88, p = 0.001; forcing by duration:
t(19) = 5.42, p = 0.00003). An analysis of the full distribution of
SRF showed a shift to higher values when participants chose the
last card in the deck or the one presented for longer duration
compared to other cards. However, in both cases the distribution
reflects many instances in which participants chose the forcing
card yet reporting free choice, or conversely, many instances in
which participants did not choose any of the forcing cards and yet
reported that they perceived that their choice was forced. A direct
comparison of the SRF in the laboratory and the live one-on-one
situation shows significantly higher values in the later (unpaired t-
test: t(49) = 7.44, p,0.00001; mean SRF in lab setup: 0.4660.17;
mean SRF in one-on-one live situation: 0.1360.20 SD) suggesting
that subjects tend to trust more their own actions in a normal
human interaction and further stressing the significant bias that
could ballast cognitive studies in artificial, laboratory set-ups.
Since the distribution of durations varied slightly in each riffle,
for robustness the analysis described above was based on the rank
of duration and not on absolute duration. Next, to specifically
address the relevant time-scales, we analyzed choice and SRF as a
function of card duration (Figure 2). This analysis showed three
distinctive regimes. Fluctuations in durations below 120 ms did
not affect choice (Figure 2c) or subjective reports (Figure 2b).
Fluctuations in duration beyond 200 ms conditioned choice,
yielding very high values of forcing with high probabilities, but this
was accompanied with an explicit report by the subjects that they
felt the chosen card had been forced. We identified an
intermediate regime – broadly confined between 120 and
200 ms - which of course is of most interest to magic (Figure 2a)-
where fluctuations in duration significantly change the likelihood
of a card being chosen (an almost 10-fold increase building up to
10% probability) without affecting the subjective perception of free
choice.
The results from the two experiments coherently show
systematic opaqueness in the capacity of a subject to identify
whether temporal properties of the stimuli play a role conditioning
their choice. This can be explicitly measured by a Receiver
Operator Characteristics (ROC) analysis [17] which, in a non-
parametric way serves to estimate how much the SRF is a faithful
estimator of whether the card had been actually forced. This
accuracy is often referred in the psychological literature as Type-II
performance, to distinguish it from Type-I performance [18,19]
which reflects accuracy in an objective task. ROC analysis can
then assign to each participant whether the SRF reports are good
descriptors of objective forcing. A participant with accurate Type-
II performance will typically show high values of SRF when the
card was forced and low values of SRF when choosing a card
which was not forced. In comparison a participant with inaccurate
Type-II performance (low ROC values) will produce very similar
distributions of SRF for objectively forced and not-forced choices
(Figure 3 top insets).
The distribution of ROC curves varied widely across subjects
(Figure 3a–b) (mean ROC area forced by position: 0.6160.12 SD;
forced by duration: 0.6260.10 SD). Interestingly, for both
categories, a substantial fraction of participants showed ROC
areas close to 0.5 (main diagonal line), indicating complete
blindness to perceive psychological forcing.
A subject by subject analysis of Type-II performance based on
position and duration (Figure 3c) revealed the following pattern: a)
5 subjects with almost chance Type-II performance, b) 6
Participants showed accurate Type-II performance based on
duration, but chance performance based on position, c) 2 subjects
with accurate Type-II performance based on position, but chance
performance based on duration, d) 7 participants showed relatively
Table 1. Subjective report of forcing in experiment 1.
VF CF Card guess
Number
guess
Ineffective
forcing
0.118 (0.033) 0.093 (0.059) 0.093 (0.031) 0.050 (0.023)
Effective forcing 0.150 (0.072) 0.129 (0.053)
Mean (SE) values of subjective report of forcing (SRF) in the Experiment 1, a
scripted routine of one-on-one magician performance. The values are in a scale
from 0 to 1, being 0 feeling free and 1 being forced.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0058254.t001
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accurate values of Type-II performance based on both variables,
i.e. could identify forced choices based on the two more canonical
forcing parameters. While the sample is not sufficiently large to
make quantitative arguments on whether these groups form
significant clusters, both ROC distributions look bimodal
(Figure 3a–b) and the scatter plot reflects a broad variability
Figure 1. Forcing by position and forcing by duration. Top panel: Probability of choice as a function of both position and rank in duration. a,
b- Probability of choice as a function of position in deck and rank in duration. Dashed lines correspond to chance level. c, d- Subjective report of free
choice as a function of position in deck and rank in duration. Dashed lines correspond to global mean. e, f- Distribution of SRFC for effective and
ineffective forcing by position and duration. Errorbars are standard errors of subjects’ means.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0058254.g001
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among subjects which can be reasonably arranged in the classes
described above. This result shows that - as is well known to
magicians - some subjects are highly vulnerable to magic since
they are unable to detect external objective forcing.
The dissociation which we observed between objective measures
of choice and subjective reports of perceived free choice raises the
question of whether physiological markers can distinctively index
each process. To make a first step in this direction we recorded the
pupil dilatation locked to the chosen card. We analyzed the
dynamics of pupil size distinctively according to subjective
(perceived forced or perceived free) and objective (chose the
forced card or another in the deck) factors. To avoid confounds
based on choices of the last cards of the deck (when there is an
abrupt change in the visual display) we only considered forcing by
duration and considered only chosen cards which were not in the
last tercile of the deck.
Pupil size showed a rich dynamics (figure 4 lower panel),
revealing a relatively late peak (,1300 ms), strongly modulated by
objective factors (i.e. whether the chosen card was the one
presented for longer duration in the riffle). Instead, early dynamics
of pupil dilatation showed a dip which was more prominent when
the participant chose a card which was forced but without
perceiving it as forced and a very small build-up of pupil-size when
the subject chose a card which was not forced and not perceived as
forced. These observations are quantified by an ANOVA analysis
performed at running bins of 50 ms, which showed an early (200–
300 ms) interaction between subjective (perceived as forced or not)
and objective (forced or not) factors and a late (1000–1400 ms)
main effect of the objective factor (figure 4 upper panel).
Discussion
Freely choosing a card in a riffle was heavily weighted by the
position of the card, with the majority of subjects opting for one of
the last two cards of the deck. This is a well known fact to
psychological research since the early investigations of Hermann
Ebbinghaus [20] As expected we observed a strong recency effect
(a tendency to recall the last items of a list) but not a primacy effect
(better recall for the first items of the list), since the later decreases
for longer lists, especially when items are presented quickly [15],
two features exaggerated in the riffles used here. Similarly,
fluctuations in duration in RSVP are expected to affect the
saliency of an item in the list [16].
Hence the factors governing choice observed in this experiment
are a mere corroboration of well known principles in psychology.
These principles are also very familiar to the magic literature and
tradition [4,13]. The novelty of our work is to investigate how
these factors affect the subjective perception held by the
participant on whether the choice he made was ‘‘free’’ or not.
Our results showed a marked introspective blindness, an inability
of subjects to understand when a choice they had made had been
forced by these main factors. This results sum to other
Figure 2. Probability of choice and SRF vs card duration. a- Histogram of card duration for all the cards, and the cards considered forced by
duration (the longest two cards of each riffle). b- Mean subjective report of forcing as a function of chosen card duration. c- Probability of choosing
cards as a function of card duration. Cards presented for more than 256 ms were combined in a single datapoint. Errorbars are standard errors of
subjects’ means.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0058254.g002
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demonstrations of introspective blindness in decision making
where factors which govern decisions and choices are not
accessible to meta-cognitive judgments such as confidence
[21,22,23,24,25] or temporal properties of the elements constitu-
tive of the decision [26,27]. Similarly, our results are also in-line
with several studies demonstrating that individuals often confab-
ulate about the rationale to explicitly justify their choices
[28,29,30,31,32].
The SRF introduced here can be thought of as the inverse of the
subjective sense of agency (SSA). A central question in this field is
whether our conscious experience of agency (SSA) is confabula-
tory, as suggested by Nisbett and Wilson [28], Wegner [32], and
Johanson et al [30] or the result of processing genuine information
about the actions and their consequences, as proposed by Moore
and Haggard [33]. Moore and Haggard [33] defend that our SSA
is almost never confabulatory but relays on feedforward neural
mechanisms that are part of the same motor programs that control
our self-initiated actions [34]. In support of this claim, Fried et al.
[35] have shown that minimal electrical stimulation of the
supplementary motor area of neurosurgical patients triggered an
urge to perform a particular movement even in the absence of the
corresponding motor behaviour. On the other hand, Moore and
Haggard [33] point out that our reasons for action could be much
more susceptible to retrospective influences and confabulation.
Therefore, the interaction between the experience of an action
and the conscious thinking about the reasons for that action could
confound the conclusions of previous reports. Our results
contribute to this argument by showing that SRFs remain the
same in the different experimental conditions, suggesting that
subjects confabulate their own SSA, particularly in situations in
which they think they chose freely a card that was physically
forced to them.
The analysis of individual ROC curves reflected a broad
variability. This indicates that the blindness to identify forcing
mechanisms in decision making varies widely across different
individuals. Similarly, meta-cognitive ability (i.e. to typically assign
high confidence in correct trials and low-confidence scores to
incorrect trials) in perceptual decision making varies across
subjects [21,22]; a variance which can be partly accounted by
gray matter volume in the anterior prefrontal cortex [21] and
Figure 3. ROC curves of each participant. ROC curves of each participant, for a- forcing by position, and b- forcing by duration. Insets: SRF
distributions of forced and non-forced choices, for the highest- and lowest- ROC area subjects. c- Individual ROC area by duration as a function of ROC
area by position.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0058254.g003
Figure 4. Pupil dynamics. Lower panel- Baseline-corrected pupil size locked to the appearance of the chosen card, for all conditions of forcing and
subjective report of forcing. Higher panel- p-value significance resulted from 2-way ANOVA performed at running bins of 50 ms. Horizontal line
corresponds to p = 0.05. Errorbars are standard errors of subjects’ means.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0058254.g004
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which can be intervened by temporal inactivation of the prefrontal
cortex with TMS [24]. Whether meta-cognitive blindness to
different elements of the decision (quality of the decision relating to
confidence, origins of the decision relating to free-will and free-
choice, constituents of the decision) involve a shared system or
functions should be a matter for future investigation.
Finally, we investigated the dynamics of pupil size as a proxy of
the neural correlates of SRF during the magic trick. Pupil size is
considered an effective measure of mental effort, attention and
cognitive control [14]. Moreover, pupil size is thought to index
activity of the locus coeruleus. The locus coeruleus (LC) is the most
important norepinephrine (NE) nucleus in the brain, with bursts of
activity following behaviourally relevant sensory events [36].
Hence LC activity, and its covariate measured as pupil-size is a
good marker to indicate saliency of an item in an RVSP and
candidate markers for subjective variables (assigning to an internal
or external driven choice) tagged to this item. Our observation that
in fact pupil size dynamics can index objective (longer duration of
an item) and subjective (perceived as being forced or not) has three
important implications: 1) First it builds up on two recent studies
showing that pupil dynamics, in spite of its intrinsic slow response
function, can be used to tag fast transients in attention and
cognitives state [25,37]. 2) It indicates, indirectly, that fluctuations
in neuromodulators which regulate pupil-size such as NE co-
occurring with stimulus presentation can modulate the subjective
construct of a choice and 3) it shows a rich dynamics with different
phases revealing non-trivial interactions between objective (forced
or not) and subjective (perceived as forced or not) at different
stages of the pupillary response.
Although attempts to establish a relationship between magic
and psychology are not new [11,38,39], recently there has been a
renewed interest in using magic techniques as a vehicle to
investigate more systematically the human brain and behaviour
[1,2,9,40]. These studies have addressed several aspects of
perception including eye-movements [41,42,43,44] attention
[7,45,46,47], visual system limits [8], self-deception [29,30], and
brain-processing of causal effects [48]. Our study follows this
fruitful tradition, by using magic to address the construction of free
will.
A basic working hypothesis in stage magic is that this
introspective construction is not a binary function but instead a
weighted combination of several factors which can be worked out
in construction to maximize the illusory perception of free choice.
Hence, the magic literature on physiological forcing is full of
techniques designed to increase an individual’s perception of
having made a free decision while being forced. Our approach was
inspired by this well established fact by magicians, showing a
concrete example of the deep insight that stage performers can
bring to the scientific studies of the human mind.
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